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INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ANONA MAUGHAN, 
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Comes now the plaintiff/appellant herein and hereby 
submits the following in response to the Brief filed by 
defendant/respondent. The purpose of this reply brief is not to 
repeat the arguments made in appellant's brief, but the purpose 
is to reply to the arguments made by respondent in her brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY 
RESPONDENT WAS THE SUB-SURFACE WATER. 
Respondent, in her brief, cites at length the law of 
proximate causation as stated in Couch on Insurance, 2d. The 
general rule, as stated in Couch, §74:696 requires respondent "to 
establish that liability within the coverage of her limited risk 
homeowner's insurance policy) her loss must result from an act, 
operation covered by the policy, it must be the proximate result 
thereof and unless it is, there is no liability." 
In Graham vs. Public Employees Mutual Insurance 
Company, 656 P.2d 1077, 1080-1081 (Wash. 1983), the Supreme Court 
of Washington stated the general rules, proximate causation when 
it held: 
"We have defined proximate cause as the cause 
which, in a natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces 
the event, and without which that event would not 
have occurred. Where the peril specifically 
insured against sets other causes in motion which, 
in an unbroken sequence and connection between the 
act and the final loss, produced the result for 
which recovery is sought, the insured peril is 
regarded as the proximate cause of the entire 
loss. 
It is the efficient or predominant cause which 
sets into motion the chain of events producing the 
loss which is regarded as the proximate loss, not 
necessarily the last act in the chain of events." 
(citations omitted) Id. at 1080-1081"; 
The general rule is again stated in 43 Am Jur 2d, 
Insurance, §463: 
"The general rule of insurance law is that only 
the proximate cause of loss, and not the remote 
cause is to be regarded in determining whether 
recovery may be had under a policy of insurance, 
and that the loss be proximately caused by a peril 
insured against. . . . In insurance cases the 
concern is only with the nature of the injury and 
how it happened. . . . In other words, in 
determining causable loss for the purpose of 
fixing insurance liability when concurring causes 
of damage appear, the proximate 
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cause to which the loss is to be attributed is or 
may be the dominant or the efficient cause — the 
one that sets the others in motion — although other 
incidental causes may be nearer in time to the 
result and may operate more immediately in 
producing the loss." 
In the present case the dominant or efficient 
cause —the one that set the other in motion—was the sub-surface 
water. Without the sub-surface water, respondent would not have 
had to hire a contractor to excavate around her home for the 
purpose of resolving the problems caused by the sub-surface 
water. 
As is clearly and unambiguously stated in respondent's 
limited risk homeowner's insurance policy, that policy does not 
insure against loss caused by, resulting from, contributing to or 
aggravated by water below the surface of the ground. In his 
affidavit, Arnold W. Coon, a structural engineer, stated that in 
his opinion the failure of the foundation walls of respondent's 
home was caused by, resulted from, contributed to, or aggravated 
by water below the surface of the ground. 
In the Graham case, supra, the mud flow which destroyed 
appellant's home in that case would not have occurred without the 
eruption of Mt. St. Helens. Graham, 656 P.2d at 1081. 
In the instant case, the excavation around respondent's 
home would not have occurred without the existence of the 
sub-surface water around respondent's home. 
-3-
Even if this Court finds it necassary to resolve this 
case based upon an inquiry on the issue of causation, it is 
respectfully submitted that such inquiry can only lead to one 
conclusion: that the sub-surface water was the proximate cause 
of the loss sustained by respondent. 
POINT II 
THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY RESPONDENT WAS CAUSED BY, 
RESULTED FROM, CONTRIBUTED TO AND WAS AGGRAVATED 
BY WATER BELOW THE SURFACE OF THE GROUND. 
The parties in their respective briefs have outlined 
for this Court the law of interpreting insurance contracts. The 
limited risk homeowner's insurance policy purchased by the 
respondent provides as follows: 
"This policy does not insure against loss: (3) 
caused by, resulting from, contributed to, or 
aggravated by any of the following: 
c. water below the surface of the ground . . .ff 
Based upon the clear and unambiguous language of the 
policy and respondent's admission that the sub-surface water was 
a contributing cause of the collapse, (respondent's brief, p. 90) 
this Court must reverse the trial Court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite respondent's argument and emphasis on the 
concept of proximate causation, this is a contract dispute. To 
resolve the issues herein, the Court must apply established rules 
of interpreting insurance contracts. The critical lauguage, the 
exclusion upon which appellant has relied to deny coverage, is 
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clear and unambiguous. The limited homeowner's insurance policy 
purchased by respondent specifically excludes loss caused by, 
resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by water below the 
surface of the ground. The evidence an|d respondent's admission, 
unequivocally established that the losis suffered by respondent 
was caused by the sub-surface water. 
If, however, this Court determines that it is necessary 
to resolve this case by examining the issue of causation, it is 
respectfully submitted that the sub+surface water was the 
dominant or efficient cause of the collapse of respondent's home. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested 
that this Court reverse the trial court's judgment. 
Dated this ->Y day of June, 1988. 
JENSEN, PUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Thomas A. Duff in '// 
Attorney for Appellant/ 
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